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Eliot went on to write profound religious 
verse, still in his trademark modernist style. 
'Ash Wednesday' is about both personal 
repentance, and Christ as the still point of the 
turning world. (Russell Kirk quotes Eliot's 
contemporary Rose Macaulay to the effect that 
this poem turned many of the rising modernist 
generation to Christianity, instead of to 
"communism, suggesting that the poem had 
an impact as apologetics.) 
Eliot wrote short poems on biblical subjects 
('Journey of the Magi' and 'Simeon's Song') 
and religious dramas (The Rock and Murder in 
the Cathedral). The major work of the latter 
part of his caree~ was T~e ~our Qu~rtets, a 
difficult, challengmg medltatlOn on tIme and 
eternity, in which unconventional religious 
imagery breaks into a distinctly modern 
consciousness. 
Eliot's brand of Christianity, an austere 
pessimistic strand described as the via nega-
tiva, was different in tone from the energetic, 
joyful version of C. S. "Lewis. The two men 
disliked each other's writing intensely and 
disagreed about literature on almost every 
point, though, as Lewis said, they agreed 
'about matters of such moment [i.e. their 
Christian faith] that all literary questions are, 
by comparison, trivial'. (For an account of 
their ongoing feud, see Dale, T. S. Eliot, 
pp. 154-155.) The two perhaps represent two 
different ways of making historic Christianity 
credible to the contemporary "imagination, or 
perhaps ways of reaching two different kinds 
of personalities. 
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G. E. VEITH 
EMPIRICISM 
Empiricism (from Gk empeiria, 'experience') is 
the important epistemological theory that all 
knowledge ultimately comes through experi-
ence. David "Hume (1711-76) wielded his 
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narrow (and unjustifiable) empiricism to the 
conclusion that human beings are not able to 
know about "causality, substance, minds or 
souls, * angels and God. Hume thought humans 
could not possibly perceive such things, and 
thus can never be said to know them. 
How is one to respond to a narrow em-
piricist like Hume? One should begin by 
examining the grounds of the justification for 
Humean empiricism. One notes quickly that 
empiricism is not self-justifying in that it cannot 
validate its own use; for its success depends on 
certain human processes working together 
somehow to produce mostly true beliefs. But, 
as C. S. "Lewis argued, if our thoughts are just 
movements among the atoms in our brains, why 
think they Are aimed at true belief? Experience 
as a source of knowledge is only as good as the 
accuracy and design structure of the mechan-
isms through which the experience occurs. If 
our cognitive structures arrived here only 
through the mechanisms of "naturalism and 
evolution, how could that causal story possibly 
account for our cognitive success? One could 
never erase the "doubt that one's mind was in 
error on any particular belief produced. But for 
a properly functioning person, experience does 
generate mostly true beliefs. The most plausible 
explanation for our cognitive success, therefore, 
is design imposed on us from outside. And 
so to justify empirical knowledge, it seems 
most plausible to approach empiricism from a 
theistic background. 
It follows that non-theistic empiric isms must 
be carefully evaluated, for they usually overstep 
their bounds and propose self-defeating prin-
ciples, or cannot account for the meaningful 
knowledge we do have. So, W. K. Clifford 
(nineteenth century) recommended that no-one 
should ever believe anything not supported by 
sufficient evidence (experience). Let us call this 
principle 'E'. What is the sufficient evidence 
for E? There cannot be sufficient evidence for E. 
Thus, it is a philosophical statement going 
beyond all available evidence. On Clifford's 
empiricism alone, E is self-defeating (it does 
not meet its own standard). The downfall 
of twentieth-century logical positivism (em-
piricism) hinged on the same self-defeating 
quality. British positivist A. J. Ayer maintained 
that a statement is meaningful if, and only if, the 
statement is analytic (true by definition alone, 
like 'all black dogs are black') or able to be 
verified through sense experience. Let us call 
this principle 'F'. Is F analytically true? No. Is F 
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able to be verified through sense experience? 
No. Thus, F is self-defeating and steps beyond 
its bounds unjustifiably. Ayer tried to patch 
up principle F, leading him to an anaemic 
empiricism that left out as meaningless some 
things we know to be meaningful, e.g. general 
propositions in * science, like 'all ravens are 
black', and unrepeatable historical truths. 
Among Christian apologists the use of 
experience to justify theistic belief is common, 
but the types of justification, and where and 
when justification takes place within an apolo-
getic system, vary. Evidentialists believe the 
truth of Christianity can be established 
through the systemization of evidences about 
the universe, "morality, consciousness, ration-
ality, design, probabilities for life, and Jesus's 
life, death and resurrection. Evidentialists 
like Montgomery, McDowell and Habermas 
argue that if one applies generally accepted 
principles of historiography and textual 
criticism to the available evidences, one will 
find the weight of probability squarely on the 
side of Christian truth. Presuppositionalists 
like Van Til are much more concerned with 
identifying the basis or conditions for making 
sense of experience before one ever asks where 
the evidences themselves point regarding 
Christianity. 
A highly significant modern argument for 
God's existence hinges on the cognitive success 
of our rationality and our belief-forming 
mechanisms. How is it that our beliefs picture 
the world rightly, i.e. that our subjective 
formation of beliefs usually conforms correctly 
and accurately with our objective presence in 
this world? C. S. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga 
have powerfully argued that "naturalism (the 
belief that nature is all there is, thus implying 
evolution is entirely responsible for our cogni-
tive apparatus) is not in itself sufficient to 
explain the success of the human cognitive 
enterprise. As Lewis said, the naturalist finds 
himself hoisted on his own petard: in the very 
act of explaining that thought is no more than 
movements among the 'grey matter', he must 
rely on the orderliness and purposiveness of 
thought patterns that are clearly aimed at 
"truth. The naturalist can only say that 
through time, chance, random mutations and 
natural selection alone such wonderful struc-
tures have been formed and are aimed, 
somehow, at producing true beliefs. But on 
naturalism and evolution, thoughts are simply 
movements of atoms or something caused by 
232 
those movements, e.g. epiphenomenal happen-
ings in the brain. There is no factor from 
outside this naturalistic picture to ensure that 
our internal cognitive structures map correctly 
to the external world and thus would produce 
true beliefs about that world (as opposed 
merely to help us display danger-avoidance 
behaviour for survival). But, according to 
Plantinga, *theism has an answer. God creates 
us in his image, part of which means to be 
rational persons with cognitive mechanisms 
producing mostly true beliefs when in the 
suitable environment. 
In many ways, we would know nothing 
without our experience. Plantinga states that 
there is even an empirical or phenomenal 
aspect to our knowledge of necessary and 
abstract truthS-such as mathematics and "logic. 
However;"Wondering whether our experience 
produces justified belief, i.e. wondering whether 
our experience is at base reliable, has an object-
ive and a significant subjective component. 
Objectively, either it is largely reliable or it is 
not. If it is not largely reliable, then there is no 
way out of this predicament. It appears to be 
largely reliable, and to act otherwise in the 
community setting is to betray the very assured-
ness experience gives us. For example, to think 
it possible that my son is not of human descent, 
and that he is older than his father, in the 
ordinary meaning of those terms, is incredible 
and philosophically untenable, but in some 
broadly logical sense possible. But the subject-
ive side of the issue intersects at this point with 
the objective: I am as sure as a knower of most 
truths I can name that I have a son, and that my 
son is younger than I am by virtue of my evident 
and undeniable experiences (e.g. seeing him 
being born and watching him mature ever since 
on more or less a daily basis). There is a 
temporal and spatial continuity to this event of 
seeing and knowing my son that is objectively 
and subjectively undeniable. And it was 
evidently designed that there would be no other 
reasonable way for me to know these facts than 
through experience and reflection. There are 
many conditions for such knowledge (memory, 
consciousness, reflection, etc.). That these 
conditions could be doubted, individually or 
severally, is true, but that it is rational to doubt 
their truth-conduciveness is not true. 
Thus, our attitude as Christians towards the 
truth of the deliverances of our senses should 
be thanksgiving. We receive it as an evident gift 
from God the creator and designer of our 
Enlightenment, The 
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senses. God has so designed us that through 
experience we come to know his world and the 
things necessary for salvation and life with 
him. Thomas "Reid remarks that all of the 
objective components that contribute to our 
knowing come out of the same shop, i.e. there 
is an integrity or wholeness in the mechanisms 
of human cognition that is admirable and 
wondrous. 
It is acceptable to maintain that our consid-
ered Christian " epistemology must combine 
elements of "rationalism and empiricism. In 
Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel "Kant was 
right when he said that concepts without 
experiences are empty (useless), and experi-
ences without concepts are blind (undirected). 
God has so ordered our minds to make sense 
of our experience. The process of God getting 
his propositional "revelation to us is largely 
empirical (transmission of the text, the act of 
reading). Clearly, however, there are Christian 
sources of rational beliefs not fully traceable 
back to experience taken alone (the act of 
inspiration of Scripture, the act of regener-
ation, the internal testimony of the *Holy 
Spirit, mystical experience, "miracles, sense of 
the divine love, near-death experiences), since 
God himself is a nonphysical spirit. Even if we 
look at human epistemology naturalistically 
(e.g. through the notion of proper function, 
following Plantinga), it is reasonable to believe 
that experience is a reliable and justified source 
of knowledge only if it flowers within a super-
naturalistic " meta physics. 
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E. N. MARTIN 
ENLIGHTENMENT, THE 
Like many labels for periods of history, 'the 
Enlightenment' was introduced by historians 
to express an estimation of the value of what 
they identify as an 'era'. Like the term 'Renais-
sance', but unlike the 'Middle Ages' or the 
'Dark Ages', 'the Enlightenment' has stood for 
a movement in thought and culture that some 
modern historians have looked upon favour-
ably. They did so because this movement 
challenged the "authority of religious tradition 
and celebrated the value, goodness and virtues 
of human nature, looking to modern "science 
to secure human progress over ignorance and 
superstition. The Enlightenment is often de-
limited from the late 1600s to the end of the 
1700s, but there is no universally accepted 
way to date the period. The closest one can 
come to a historical summary of Enlighten-
ment thought is Immanuel "Kant's (1724-
1804) dictum that 'Enlightenment is man's 
emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one's under-
standing without guidance from another. This 
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies 
not in lac!s. of understanding, but in lack of 
resolve and courage to use it without guidance 
from.-another. Sapere Aude! Have courage to 
use your own understanding! That is the motto 
of enlightenment' (Kant, p. 85). 
In addition to Kant, key figures who are 
often seen as champions of the Enlightenment 
include Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), John 
"Locke (1632-1704), Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755), Fran\=ois Marie Arouet de 
*Voltaire (1694-1778), David "Hume (1711-
76), Denis Diderot (1713-84), Adam Smith 
(1723-90), and Baron de Holbach (1723-89). 
Sometimes, Rene "Descartes (1596-1650), 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Benedict de 
"Spinoza (1632-77) are included as members 
of this group. Many of these thinkers may be 
seen from today's perspective as having truly 
made an enduring, positive impact on European 
culture and beyond. Certainly their opposi-
tion to religious intolerance and persecution 
is significant and the pursuit of intellectual 
freedom by opposing excessive censorship 
is important. Moreover, the Enlightenment 
ushered in a level of critical reflection on religion 
which produced masterpieces in both the case 
for and the case against religious belief. Of the 
figures named, Locke articulated and defended 
a vital role for Christianity in culture and 
politics; Holbach and Diderot wrote polemics 
against religion, as did Voltaire, though 
Voltaire's work was often more anti-clerical 
than anti-theistic. Enlightenment thinkers like 
Voltaire commended a natural religion that 
recognized God and an afterlife but shunned 
special providence, scriptural authority and 
"miracles. Hume and Kant delivered systematic 
critical treatments of the classical theistic argu-
ments, though Hume may be interpreted as a 
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